The diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) in a nursery teacher led to a total of 282 adults and children being screened for TB, and 67 of these contracted the condition. Latent and active factors mitigated against earlier diagnosis of the disease during the multiple contacts by the teacher with the healthcare system over 18 months. A series of barely inter-linked events meant that the system failed the patient and consequently the contacts who contracted the disease. The system errors were widespread and render possible a similar occurrence elsewhere.
Background
In the Spring of 2001, a 30-year-old nursery teacher resident in London was admitted to a hospital distant from home while on a weekend break with symptoms of breathlessness, chest pain and severe cough. A diagnosis of smear-positive pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) was quickly made and treatment started immediately. The Public Health Department in the teacher's district of residence established an incident team and set about screening close and casual contacts of the teacher for TB. A total of 282 people were screened. Twelve cases of TB disease and 55 of TB infection were diagnosed; 10 with disease and 45 with infection were children. All cases were treated appropriately.
The teacher started consulting with her general practice in 1999 with symptoms, which in retrospect were probably the onset of TB. The usual characteristics of this disease are shown in Table 1 . Neither the index case nor the 67 close and casual contacts who contracted some form of TB fitted these categories. The final diagnosis was not made until 18 months later as an admission to hospital. In the interim there were many contacts both with general practice and hospital care in the NHS, and a short period in the private sector; none of these were specialist TB services ( Table 2) .
The authors of this paper comprised an inquiry team, established at the health authority to ascertain the individual and system factors that led to the outbreak and the lessons to be learnt. Every clinician involved in care of the patient was interviewed and notes were examined in detail. Clinical opinion external to the inquiry team was sought.
Active failures and latent conditions contributing to the serious incident
These are summarized in Table 3 . The adverse event was the outbreak, but an important contributing error was the failure to make a correct diagnosis in the index case (the teacher) over a long period when there were apparently many opportunities to do so. By mid-1999 when the teacher was becoming unwell, the computerized clinical notes record evidence of a gradual deterioration in health. As in many young consulters with general practice, the teacher sometimes attended the surgery at short notice, leading to 'emergency' appointments. Four out of 12 appointments with the general practice between late 1998 (when a 'new-patient' medical examination was carried out) and early 2001 were in this category ( Table 2) .
There were some important tests that might have led to a common train of thought about TB. Among several blood tests taken in general practice, C-reactive protein (CRP) was slightly raised early in 1999. The teacher self-referred to a private osteopath for the symptom of shoulder pain. As the pain was atypical, an X-ray of the chest and spine was ordered; the lungs were reported as clear. An urgent referral to the Ear, Nose and Throat Department of the local hospital found no serious pathology for a complaint of hoarseness, and upper gastrointestinal investigations for weight loss and pain found no local pathology. The patient continued to see different doctors at the practice. One challenge for the general practitioners (GPs) was that low continuity of care probably reduced the common thread of thought about the diverse symptoms of this patient, Factors contributing to the cause of a community outbreak of tuberculosis particularly, as it was not always clear that the health of the patient was deteriorating to such a degree. Substantial weight loss was now occurring but was not a matter of complaint and the degree of coughing was not appreciated by the doctors. A second test taken in general practice for CRP was significantly elevated in 2000 but with no apparent explanation. Clinicians in secondary care were unaware of this result.
The practice was computerized and recorded the clinical details of the consultations and investigation results in the computer record. It became apparent to the inquiry team that a conscious effort is needed to scroll back through sufficient screens to retrieve the relevant information. Not all computer systems easily highlight abnormal results. Computer records have some disadvantages, because it may be harder to take an overview of a case quickly.
There was no communication between the private sector clinicians and the general practice about this patient. In addition, the chest X-ray taken for shoulder and upper chest pain reported as normal at the early stages of the disease was abnormal, highlighting the low index of suspicion for TB among mainstream diagnosticians particularly in 'routine' reading sessions.
System solutions and lessons for individual clinicians
There are varied reasons for delays in diagnosis of TB. 1 The series of events that aligned perpetuate a missed diagnosis for almost 18 months and is an example of how the system failed this patient and the contacts who developed TB subsequently. Neither the NHS nor the private sector provided a culture of high reliability to counteract individual human errors in the diagnosis of TB. 2 Modern general practice has lost longitudinal continuity of care. 3 GPs elsewhere have identified patients who defy diagnosis as one of the major challenges to effective primary care and this challenge is not rectified by simply learning more about evidence-based approaches. The issues are about diagnostic skill, rapport, time and continuity of care. 4 The GPs in this case were offered and accepted one-to-one counselling on consultation skills.
Furthermore, patients and doctors do not seem to agree on how and when to consult. 5 Young people in particular may value speed of access over continuity. Robust practice systems enabling continuity of care are therefore required. These include automatic prompting, better design of computerized records for general practice, patient smart cards, and, where appropriate, patient advocacy.
The doctor will be dependent on good notes. In this case, we believe that the computerized notes made it more difficult to take an overview of the case. Computer skills need to be good to compare trends over several weeks or retrieve investigation results. Computer summary screens need to be kept up to date. Healthcare professionals need time to learn and regularly update their skills. The practice has undertaken a review of how their computers can identify dual screens and training is on offer.
The European Working Party on Quality in Family Practice has exhorted primary and secondary care clinicians to cooperate in treating patients so that the patient becomes a shared responsibility. 6 This is unlikely to happen in the context of high volume, diagnostic secondary care services unless tools are available that make it very easy for the consultant to give an opinion beyond their particular body system. Practices might, for example, consider a template for referral letters to secondary care colleagues including results of all recent investigations. The clinician receiving a request for direct access to a specific service could then better solve diagnostic mysteries. They might provide advice about further investigations if the cause of the symptoms is not ascertained by that service. Equally, specialists, whether in Table 3 Latent conditions and active failures summarized
Latent conditions Active failures
The full patient history and significant results rendered difficult to CRP test abnormal on two occasions and not picked up and appreciate in a snapshot by the need to scroll back through followed through. Patient presented at short notice for some computerized notes consultations and was difficult to contact for some others. The lack of this logic left some important abnormal findings unexplained while multiple clinicians looked for specific diagnoses. Secondary care clinicians are not confident in our location that there is inclination or time to pursue these recommendations because of pressure of service targets. Misinterpretation of X-rays has also been reported elsewhere, particularly concerning TB in developed countries. 1 In London and other urban centres, radiologists and frontline clinical staff should ensure that their skills are current in the detection of TB. Feedback to the radiologist involved was sympathetically received, as were the implications for CPD. More generally, errors in interpreting radiographs can be reduced by redesigning systems for diagnosis and ensuring an audit loop is closed in reviewing those cases that have been missed. 7 However, overall, the events remain a sensitive issue for individual clinicians. Despite dealing with a progressive, modern general practice, we are not convinced that true double loop learning occurred either in the general practice or hospital settings involved. UK general practice is a difficult medium to effect sustainable system changes because it comprises a multiplicity of small organizations that render it vulnerable to denying the widespread existence of system errors. 8 TB is uncommon in mainstream hospital medicine. Therefore, the events demonstrated in this case could quite easily reoccur elsewhere.
